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Abstract
We consider mechanisms that provide traders the opportunity to exchange
commodity i for commodity j, for certain ordered pairs ij: Given any connected graph G of opportunities, we show that there is a unique mechanism
MG that satis…es some natural conditions of “fairness” and “convenience”.
Let M(m) denote the class of mechanisms MG obtained by varying G on
the commodity set f1; : : : ; mg. We de…ne the complexity of a mechanism
M in M(m) to be a pair of integers (M ); (M ) which represent the “time”
required to exchange i for j and the “information”needed to determine the
exchange ratio (each in the worst case scenario, across all i 6= j). This induces
a quasiorder on M(m) by the rule
M

M 0 if (M )

(M 0 ) and

(M )

(M 0 ):

We show that, for m > 3, there are precisely three -minimal mechanisms
MG in M(m), where G corresponds to the star, cycle and complete graphs.
The star mechanism has a distinguished commodity –the money –that serves
as the sole medium of exchange and mediates trade between decentralized
markets for the other commodities.
In honor of Lloyd Shapley.
Stony Brook Center for Game Theory, Dept. of Economics; and Cowles Foundation
for Research in Economics, Yale University
z
Department of Mathematics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey
x
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University; and Santa Fe Institute,
New Mexico.
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Our main result is that, for any weights ; > 0; the star mechanism is
the unique minimizer of (M ) + (M ) on M(m) for large enough m:
JEL Classi…cation: C70, C72, C79, D44, D63, D82.
Keywords: exchange mechanism, minimal complexity, prices, money.
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Introduction

We start with a Cournotian model of an exchange mechanism M on commodity set f1; : : : ; mg ; in which the actions available to traders are of a
very simple kind1 . For certain ordered pairs ij; pre-speci…ed by M , each
trader may o¤er any quantity of commodity i in order to obtain commodity
j. Once every o¤er is in, the mechanism M redistributes to the traders all
the commodities it has received, holding back nothing. The returns to the
traders are calculated by an algorithm2 that is common knowledge. Thus
a mechanism M is characterized by a collection of exchange opportunities,
which form directed graph G on f1; : : : ; mg, and the algorithm. We assume
throughout that G is connected, i.e., M permits iterative exchange of any i
for any j:
At this level of generality, there are in…nitely many mechanisms for any
given graph G. However, we shall show that only one of them satis…es some
natural conditions of “fairness”and “convenience”(see section 3). This special mechanism is denoted MG and is described precisely in section 2. It is
a striking property of MG that it admits unique prices3 , which depend only
on the aggregate o¤ers by the traders on the various edges of G, and which
mediate trade in the following strong sense: …rst, the return to any trader
1

It is our purpose to see how far matters may develop within such an elementary
Cournot mechanism. In particular, note that ex ante there are no “prices” to refer to,
upon which a trader may condition his o¤ers. We do show that prices can be “admitted”,
i.e., de…ned, but this happens ex post once unconditional o¤ers for trade have come into
the mechanism. Our mechanisms are thus a far cry from the more complex Bertrand
mechanisms, in which traders use prices alongside quantities in order to make contingent
statements to protect themselves against vagaries of the market (see,e.g., [4], [22]). An
analysis analogous to ours might well be possible in the Bertrand setting, but that is a
topic for future exploration.
2
There is no presumption that the algorithm be “informationally decentralized”. Indeed even the return to a simple o¤er of i, made only via the pair ij, may well depend on
all the o¤ers at every kl 2 G; and may thus require a lot of information for its computation.
3
Prices are rays in Rm
++ , i.e., invariant under multiplication by positive constants, and
represent consistent exchange rates between commodities.
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depends only on his own o¤ers and the prices; second, the total value —
under the prevailing prices — of every trader’s o¤ers is equal to that of his
returns. The immediate upshot of price mediation is that the returns to any
trader can be calculated in a transparent manner from the price ratios pi =pj
and his own o¤ers.
Thus we are led to consider the class M(m) of mechanisms MG , where G
ranges over all directed, connected graphs on the vertex set f1; : : : ; mg. The
cardinality of M(m); though …nite, grows super-exponentially in m: However
we shall show in section 2 that if one invokes natural complexity considerations, based on the time needed to exchange any commodity i for j and the
information needed to determine the exchange ratio pi =pj , then the welter
of mechanisms in M(m) is eliminated and we are left with only three mechanisms of minimal complexity, namely those that arise from the star, cycle
and complete graphs (Theorem 1). Indeed, provided m is large enough, just
the star mechanism remains (Theorem 2) in which one commodity emerges
endogenously as money and mediates trade across decentralized markets for
the other commodities4 .

2

The Emergence of Money

Let G be a directed and connected graph5 with vertex set f1; : : : ; mg. We
de…ne a mechanism MG as follows. Each trader can use every opportunity
in M; i.e., place arbitrary weights on the edges ij of G; representing his o¤er
of i for j: Let bij denote the total weight on ij (i.e., the aggregate amount
of commodity i o¤ered for j by all traders). We shall specify what happens
when bij > 0 for every edge ij in G, i.e., when there is su¢ cient diversity in
4

To be precise: the price of any commodity 1
i
m 1 , in terms of money m;
depends only on the aggregate o¤ers on edges im and mi; and thus this pair of edges may
be viewed as a decentralized market for i and m; with m mediating between the various
markets.
5
In this paper by a graph we mean a directed simple graph. Such a graph G consists of
a …nite vertex set VG , togther with an edge set EG VG VG that does not contain any
loops, i.e., edges of the form ii. For simplicity we shall often write i 2 G, ij 2 G in place
of i 2 VG , ij 2 EG but there should be no confusion. By a path ii1 i2 : : : ik j from i to j we
mean a nonempty sequence of edges in G of the form ii1 ; i1 i2 ; : : : ; ik 1 ik ; ik j:If k = 0 then
the path consists of the single edge ij, otherwise we insist that the intermediate vertices
i1 ; : : : ; ik be distinct from each other and from the endpoints i; j. However we do allow
i = j, in which case the path is called a cycle. We say that G is connected if for any two
vertices i 6= j there is a path from i to j.
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the population of traders so that each opportunity is active. Denote b = (bij )
and let Rm
be the set of rays in Rm
++ =
++ representing prices. It is well-known
that (with bij understood to be 0 if ij is not an edge in G) there is a unique
satisfying
ray p = p(b) in Rm
++ =
X
X
pi bij =
pj bji for all j:
(1)
i

i

Note that the left side of (1) is the total value of all the commodities
“chasing” j, while the right side is the total value of commodity j on o¤er;
thus (1) is tantamount to “value conservation”.
It is shown in [29] that the prices are given by the formula
X
Y
pi =
bT where bH =
bij for any subgraph H
(2)
T 2Ti

ij2H

and Ti is the collection of all trees in G that are rooted at i (i.e., subgraphs
of G in which there is a unique directed path from each j 6= i to i):
The principle of value conservation, which determines prices, also determines trade. An individual who o¤ers aij units of i via opportunity ij
gets back rj units of j, where pi aij = pj rj: More generally, if a trader o¤ers
a = (aij )
0 across all edges of G, he gets a return r(a; b) 2 Rm
+ whose
components are given by
X
rj (a; b) =
(pi =pj )aij
(3)
i

for all j: Thus the return to a trader depends only on his o¤er a and the
price ratios pi =pj ; which are well-de…ned functions of b (unlike the price vector
p = (pi ) which is only de…ned up to a scalar multiple). It might be instructive
to see the formulae for price ratios (and thereby also for returns, thanks to
equation (3)) for speci…c mechanisms. Let us, from now on, identify two
mechanisms if one can be obtained from the other by relabeling commodities.
There are three mechanisms of special interest to us called the star, cycle,
and complete mechanisms; with the following edge-sets and price ratios:
G
EG
pi =pj

Star
Cycle
fmi; im : i < mg f12; 23; : : : ; m1g
bmi bjm =bim bmj
bj;j+1 =bi;i+1

Complete
fij : i 6= jg

For the star and cycle mechanisms, the right-hand side of (2) involves a
single tree and, in the ratio pi =pj ; several factors cancel leading to the simple
4

expressions in the table above. However, for the complete mechanism there
is no cancellation and in fact here each price ratio depends on every bij :
The class of G-mechanisms is the set
M(m) = fMG : G is a directed, connected graph on f1; : : : ; mgg :

(4)

Although …nite, M(m) is rather large, indeed super-exponential in m: We
shall see that some natural complexity considerations help cut down its size.
Consider a trader who interfaces with M 2 M(m) in order to exchange
i for j. A natural concern for him would be: what is the minimum number
of time periods ij (M ) needed to accomplish this exchange? We de…ne the
time-complexity of M to be
(M ) = max
i6=j

ij

(M ) :

(5)

It is evident that ij (M ) is the length of the shortest path in G from i to j
and (M ) is the diameter of the graph G:
The other concern of our trader would be: how much of commodity j can
he get per unit of i? It follows from equation (3) that he can calculate this
from the state b of the mechanism which determines the price ratio 6 pi =pj .
Thus the question can be rephrased: how many components of b does he
need to know7 in order to calculate pi =pj ? The table above indicates that it
is easier to compute pi =pj for the star and cycle mechanisms than, say, the
complete mechanism.
To make this notion precise, if f is a function of several variables x =
(x1; : : : ; xl ), let us say that the component i of x is in‡uential if there are
two inputs x; x0 , di¤ering only in the i-th place, such that f (x) 6= f (x0 ).
De…ne ij (M ) to be the number of in‡uential components of b in the price
ratio function pi =pj : For example, from the expression for pi =pj for the star
mechanism in the previous table, it is clear that ij (M ) is 4 unless one of i
or j is m; in which case it is 2 We de…ne the price complexity of M to be
(M ) = max
i6=j

6

ij (M ):

(6)

If there is a continuum of traders (see Section 7), his own action has no a¤ect on the
price ratio. Otherwise it a¤ects the aggregate o¤er and thereby the price ratio, which is
but to be expected in an oligopolistic framework. In either case, equation (3) applies; and
pi =pj is the exchange ratio between i and j.
7
And, since he always knows his own o¤er, this is the same as asking: how many
components does he need to know of the aggregate o¤er of the others ?
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We now de…ne a quasiorder
M

M0

()

(re‡exive and transitive) on M(m) by
0

(M )

(M 0 ) and

(M )

0

(M 0 )

(7)

We are ready to state our main result8 .
Theorem 1 If9 m > 3 then the three special mechanisms are precisely the
-minimal10 elements of M (m). Their complexities are as follows:
Star Cycle Complete
(M )
4
2
m(m 1)
(M )
2
m 1
1
This has the following immediate consequence.
Theorem 2 Given any choice of strictly positive weights ; > 0; there
exists an integer m0 such that for m m0 the star mechanism is the unique
minimizer in M(m) of
(M ) + (M ):
Theorem 2 says that, so long as traders ascribe positive weight to both
time and price complexity considerations, the star mechanism with money
is the unique optimal mechanism as soon as the number of commodities is
su¢ ciently large.
Remark 3 In fact m0 does not have to be too large. We only require 4 +
2 < 2 + (m 1) and 4 + 2 < m(m 1) + for the star to beat the
cycle and complete mechanisms, respectively; which may be rearranged
m>2

+ 3 and m2

m>

+4

So, for example, if at least 10% weight is accorded to both and ; then
= and = can each be at most 9 and the above inequalities will hold if
m > 18 + 3 and m2 m > 9 + 4; thus m0 = 22 does the job.
8

A word about the numbering system used in this paper: all theorems, remarks, conditions, lemmas etc. are arranged in a single grand sequence. Thus the reader shall see,
in order of appearance: Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Remark 3, Condition 4,. . . . This does not
mean that Condition 4 is the fourth condition; in fact it is the …rst condition, but it has
fourth place in the grand sequence (and, the marker 4 makes the remark easy to locate).
9
When m = 3, we get a fourth mechanism with complexities 4; 2 identical to the star
mechanism. And when m = 2, we must change 4 to 2 in the table (the three graphs
become identical with complexities 2; 2 for each).
10
M is said to be -minimal in M(m) if there is no M 0 2 M(m) for which (M 0 )
(M )
and (M 0 )
(M ), with strict inequality in at least one place.
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3

Characterization of G-mechanisms

Our analysis above was carried out on the domain M(m). We now show
how to derive M(m) from a more general standpoint. To this end, let us
…rst de…ne an abstract exchange mechanism on commodity set f1; : : : ; mg
and with trading opportunities given by a directed, connected graph G on
f1; : : : ; mg. Such a mechanism allows individuals in f1; : : : ; ng to trade by
means of quantity o¤ers in each commodity i across all edges ij in G: (Here
m is …xed and n can be arbitrary.) The o¤er of any trader can thus be viewed
as an m m non-negative matrix in the space
S = fa : aij = 0 if ij 2
= G, aij

0 otherwiseg

De…ne
S+ = fa 2 S : aij > 0 if ij 2 Gg
Also de…ne
P

a = (a1 ; : : : ; am )

where ai = j aij is the i-th row sum of a and denotes the total amount
of commodity i involved in sending o¤er ai : Let S n be the n-fold Cartesian
product of S with itself, and (with a = (a1 ; : : : ; an )) let
(
)
n
X
S(n) = a 2 S n :
a 2 S+
=1

denote the n-tuples of o¤ers that are positive on aggregate. Also let C = Rm
+
denote the commodity space; and C n its n-fold product.
An exchange mechanism M , for a given set f1; : : : ; mg of commodities
and with trading opportunities in accordance with the graph G, is a collection
of maps (one for each positive integer n) from S(n) to C n such that, if a 2
S(n) leads to returns r 2 C n , then we have
n
X

a =

=1

n
X

r ;

=1

i.e., there is conservation of commodities. It is furthermore understood, in
keeping with our concept of opportunity ij; that for an o¤er a 2 S whose only
non-zero components are faij : j = : : :g, the return will consist exclusively of
commodity j:
7

We shall impose four conditions on the mechanisms which re‡ect “convenience”and “fairness”in trade. The …rst condition is that the mechanism
must be blind to all other characteristics of a trader except for his o¤er (and
rules out discrimination on irrelevant grounds):
Condition 4 (Anonymity) Suppose a 2 S(n) and a = a : Let r denote
the returns that accrue from a:Then r = r :
The second condition is that if any trader pretends to be two di¤erent
persons by splitting his o¤er, the returns to the others is una¤ected. In
its absence, traders would be faced with the complicated task of tracking
everyone’s o¤ers. It is easier (and su¢ cient!) to state this condition for the
“last”trader.
Condition 5 (Aggregation) Suppose a 2 S(n) and b 2 S(n + 1) are such
that a = b for < n and an = bn + bn+1 . Let r,s denote the returns that
accrue from a;b respectively. Then r = s for < n:
Anonymity and Aggregation immediately imply that, regardless of the
size n of the population, the return to any trader may be written r(a; b);where
a 2 S is his own o¤er and b 2 S+ is the aggregate of all o¤ers. Thus
(a; b) = r(a; b) a denotes his net trade.
The third condition is Invariance. Its main content is that the maps which
comprise M are invariant under a change of units in which commodities are
measured. This makes the mechanism much simpler to operate in: one does
not need to keep track of seven pounds or seven kilograms or seven tons, just
the numeral 7 will do.
In what follows, we will consistently use a for an individual’s o¤er and b
for the positive aggregate o¤er; so, when we refer to the pair a; b it will be
implicit that a 2 S, b 2 S+ and a b.
Condition 6 (Invariance) ( a; b) =
strictly positive diagonal matrix :

(a; b) for all a; b and any m m

The fourth, and last, condition is that no trader can get strictly less than
his o¤er (otherwise, such unfortunate traders would tend to abandon the
mechanism).
Condition 7 (Non-dissipation) If (a; b) 6= 0; then
component i:
8

i (a; b)

> 0 for some

It turns out that these four conditions categorically determine a unique
mechanism.
Theorem 8 Let M be an exchange mechanism on commodity set f1; : : : ; mg
and let G be the (directed, connected) graph induced by the trading opportunities in M: If M satis…es Anonymity, Aggregation, Invariance and Nondissipation, then M = MG :
3.0.1

Comments on the Conditions

Aggregation does not imply that if two individuals were to merge, they would
be unable to enhance their “oligopolistic power”. For despite the Aggregation condition, the merged individuals are free to coordinate their actions
by jointly picking a point in the Cartesian product of their action spaces.
Indeed all the mechanisms we obtain display this “oligopolistic e¤ect”, even
though they also satisfy Aggregation.
It is worthy of note that the cuneiform tablets of ancient Sumeria, which
are some of the earliest examples of written language and arithmetic, are in
large part devoted to records and receipts pertaining to economic transactions. Invariance postulates the "numericity" property of the maps r(a; b)
(equivalently, (a; b)) making them independent of the underlying choice of
units, and this goes to the very heart of the quantitative measurement of
commodities. In its absence, one would need to …gure out how the maps are
altered when units change, as they are prone to do, especially in a dynamic
economy. This would make the mechanism cumbersome to use.
Non-dissipation (in conjunction with Aggregation, Anonymity, and the
conservation of commodities) immediately implies no-arbitrage: for any a; b
neither (a; b) 0 nor (a; b) 0: To check this, we need consider only the
case a b and rule out (a; b) 0: Denote c = b a: Then (a; b) + (c; b) =
(a + c; b) = (b; b) = 0; where the …rst equality follows from Aggregation,
and the last from conservation of commodities. But then (a; b) 0 implies
(c; b) 0; contradicting Non-dissipation.
3.0.2

Alternative Characterizations of G-Mechanisms

The formula (3) for the return function of a G-mechanism immediately implies
p(b) = p(c) =) r(a; b) = r(a; c) for all a 0 and b; c > 0
(8)
9

In [8], a mechanism was supposed to produce both trades and prices, based
upon everyone’s o¤ers; and the property (8) was referred to as Price Mediation. It was shown in [8] that M(m) is characterized by Anonymity, Aggregation, Invariance, Price Mediation and Accessibility ( the last representing
a weak form of continuity): An alternative characterization of M(m), which
assumes –as we do here –that a mechanism produces only trades (and no
prices), was given in [9]. Here we have presented a simpli…ed version of the
analysis in [9], and established that MG arises “naturally” once we assume
that trading opportunities are restricted to pairwise exchange of commodities, i.e., correspond to the edges of a connected graph G: In contrast, in both
[8] and [9], the opportunity structure G was itself an object of deduction,
starting from a more abstract viewpoint.

3.1

Related Literature

The need for money in an exchange mechanism has been a topic of much
discussion. We give a brief synopsis. (For a much fuller survey, see [35] and
[36].)
Several search-theoretic models, involving random bilateral meetings between long-lived agents, have been developed following Jevons [17] (see, e.g.,
[2], [16], [18], [19], [20], [21], [23], [38] and the references therein). These
models turn on utility-maximizing behavior and beliefs of the agents in Nash
equilibrium, and shed light on which commodities are likely to get adopted as
money. A parallel, equally distinctive, strand of literature builds on partial
or general equilibrium models with other kinds of frictions in trade, such as
limited trading opportunities in each period, or transaction costs (see, e.g.,
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [24], [25], [36], [37], [39]). In many of these models, a
speci…c trading mechanism is exogenously …xed, and the focus is on activity
within the mechanism that is induced by equilibrium, based again on the
optimal behavior of utilitarian individuals.
Our approach complements this literature in two salient ways, and brings
to light a new rationale for money that is di¤erent from those proposed earlier, but not inimical to them, in that the door is left fully open to incorporate
their concerns within our framework. First, as we have emphasized, our focus
is purely on mechanisms of trade with no regard to the characteristics of the
individuals such as their endowments, production technologies, preferences
or beliefs. Second, no speci…c trading mechanism is speci…ed ex-ante by us.
We start with a welter of mechanisms and cut them down by our four condi10

tions and by complexity considerations, ultimately ending up with the star
mechanism.
The model we present builds squarely upon [8], which provided an axiomatic characterization of the …nite set of "G-mechanisms" (see section 2),
bridging the gap between the Shapley-Shubik model of decentralized “trading
posts”, i.e., the star mechanism (see [31], [32], [33]) and the Shapley model
of centralized “windows”, i.e., the complete mechanism (see [30]). Various
strategic market games, based upon trading posts, have been analyzed, with
commodity or …at money in [5], [26], [27], [28], [31], [32], [33], [34]; most of
these papers also discuss the convergence of Nash equilibria (NE) to Walras equilibria (WE) under replication of traders. For a continuum-of-traders
version, with details on explicit properties of the commodity money (its distribution and desirability) or of …at money (its availability and the harshness
of default penalties), under which we obtain equivalence (or near-equivalence)
of NE and WE, see [7], [10]; and, for an axiomatic approach to the equivalence
phenomenon, see [6].
Strategic market games di¤er in a fundamental sense from the Walras
equilibrium model, despite the equivalence of NE and WE. In the WE framework, agents always optimize generating supply and demand, but markets
do not clear except at equilibrium. We are left in the dark as to what
happens outside of equilibrium. In sharp contrast markets always clear, producing prices and trades based on agents’ strategies, in the market games;
but agents do not optimize except at equilibrium. The very formulation of a
game demands that the “game form”, i.e., the map from strategies to outcomes, must be de…ned prior to the introduction of agents’ preferences on
outcomes; thus disentangling the physics of trade from its psychology. Our
mechanisms are …rmly in this genre, and indeed form the bases upon which
many market games are built. To be precise: game forms arise from our
mechanisms by introducing private endowments, along with the constraints
that these impose on individuals’ o¤ers; and strategic market games then
arise by further introducing preferences.

11

4
4.1

Proofs
4

Graphs with complexity

Let G be a connected graph on f1; : : : ; mg as in section 2, and write
pi (G) = pi (MG ) , pij (G) = pij (MG ) and
If G consists of a single vertex then
Lemma 9 If G is a cycle then

(G) =

(MG )

(G) = 0 by de…nition.

(G) = 2:

Proof. Each vertex i in a cycle has a unique outgoing edge,
Q and we denote
Q
its weight by11 ai . For each i we have pi = bG =ai where bG = ij2G bij = i ai
as in (2); hence pi =pj = aj =ai and the result follows.
By a chorded cycle we mean a graph that is a union G = C [ P where C
is a cycle and P , the chord, is a path that connects two distinct vertices of
C, but which is otherwise disjoint from C.
Lemma 10 If G = C [ P is a chorded cycle then

(G) = 4.

Proof. Let i be the initial vertex of the path P , then i has two outgoing
edges, ij and ik say, on the cycle and path respectively. Any vertex l 6= i
has a unique outgoing edge, and we denote its weight by al as before. Let
x be the terminal vertex of the path P . If x = j then G has two j-trees,
otherwise there is a unique j-tree; similarly if x = k then there are two
k-trees, otherwise there is a unique k-tree. Thus we get the following table:
pj =bG
pk =bG

aj

1

x=j
bik1 + bij1
ak 1 bij1

ak 1

x=k
aj 1 bik1
bik1 + bij1

x 6= j; k
aj 1 bik1
ak 1 bij1

In every case, the ratio pj =pk depends on all 4 variables aj ; ak ; bij ; bik , thus
(G) 4.
On the other hand, since all vertices other than i have a unique outgoing
edge, it follows that if x is any vertex then every x-tree contains all the
outgoing edges except perhaps the edges bij ; bik and ax (if x 6= i); thus px
is divisible by all other weights. It follows that for any two vertices x; y
the ratio px =py can only depend on the variables bij ; bik ; ax ; ay . Thus we get
(G) 4 and hence (G) = 4 as desired.
11

This is a departure from our convention heretofore that a shall refer to an individual’s
o¤er, and b to the aggregate o¤er; but there should be no confusion.

12

Remark 11 A special case of a chorded cycle is a graph T0 with three vertices
that we call a chorded triangle.
3
"#
1

!

2

p1
p2
p3

b23 b31
b12 b31
b23 (b12 + b13 )

p1 =p2
p2 =p3
p3 =p1

b23 =b12
b12 b31 =b23 (b12 + b13 )
(b12 + b13 ) =b31

For future use we note that for each index j there is an i such that

ij

3:

By a k-rose we mean a graph that is a union C1 [
[ Ck , where the
Ci are cycles that share a single vertex j, but which are otherwise disjoint.
Thus a 0-rose is a single vertex and a 1-rose is a cycle. If G is a k-rose for
some k 2 then we will simply say that G is a rose:
If each cycle in a rose G has exactly two vertices, i.e., is a bidirected edge,
then we say that G is a star.
Lemma 12 If G is a rose then

(G) = 4.

Proof. Let G be the union of cycles C1 [
[ Ck with common vertex j
as above. Let a1 ; : : : ; ak be the weights of the outgoing edges from j in cycles
C1 ; : : : ; Ck respectively, and for all other vertices x let bx denote the weight
of the unique outgoing edge at x: It is easy to see that there for each vertex v
of G there is a unique v-tree, and thus the price vectors are given as follows:
Y
ai p j
if x 6= j is a vertex of Ci
bx , p x =
pj =
b
x
x6=j
Thus we get
pj =px = bx =ai ;

py =px = bx al =by ai if y 6= j is a vertex of Cl

Taking i 6= l, we see that py =px depends on 4 variables, and (G) = 4.
Our main result is a classi…cation of connected graphs with (G) 4.
Theorem 13 If G is not a chorded cycle or a k-rose, then

(G)

5.

We give a brief sketch of the proof of this theorem, which will be carried
out in the rest of this section. The actual proof is organized somewhat
di¤erently, but the main ideas are as follows.
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We say that a graph H is a minor of G, if H can be obtained from G by
removing some edges and vertices, and collapsing certain kinds of edges. Our
…rst key result is that the property (G) 4 is a hereditary property, in the
sense that connected minors of such graphs also satisfy the property. The
usual procedure for studying a hereditary property is to identify the forbidden
minors, namely a set of graphs such that G fails to have the property i¤
it contains one of the graphs from . We identify a …nite collection of such
graphs. The …nal step is to show that if G is not a chorded cycle or a k-rose
then it contains one of the forbidden minors.
We note the following immediate consequence of the results of this section.
Corollary 14 If G is not a cycle then

4.2

ij

(G)

4 for some ij.

Subgraphs

Throughout this section G denotes a connected graph. We say that a graph
H is a subgraph of G if H is obtained from G by deleting some edges and
vertices.
Proposition 15 If G0 is a connected subgraph of G then

(G)

(G0 ).

Proof. For a vertex i in G0 let p0i and pi denote its price in G0 and G
respectively; we …rst relate p0i to a certain specialization of pi .
Let E; E 0 be the edge sets of G; G0 respectively, and let E0 (resp. E1 )
denote the edges in E n E 0 whose source vertex is inside (resp. outside) G0 .
Let pi be the specialization of pi obtained by setting the edge weights in E0
and E1 to 0 and 1 respectively. Then we claim that
p0i = jF j pi ;
where F is the set of directed forests
1. the root vertices of

(9)

in G such that

are contained in G0 ,

2. the non-root vertices of

consist of all G-vertices not in G0 :

Indeed, consider the expression of pi as a sum of i-trees in G. The specialization pi assigns zero weight to all trees with an edge from E0 . The
remaining i-trees in G are precisely of the from [ where is an i-tree
14

in G0 and 2 F , and these get assigned weight wt ( ). Formula (9) is an
immediate consequence.
Now if i; j are vertices in G0 , then formula (9) gives
p0i
pi
=
0
pj
pj
Thus the ij price ratio in G0 is obtained by a specialization of the ratio
in G. Consequently the former cannot involve more variables. Taking the
maximum over all i; j we get (G)
(G0 ) as desired.

4.3

Collapsible edges

We write out(k) for the number of outgoing edges at the vertex k. In a
connected graph we have out(k)
1 for all vertices, and we will say k is
ordinary if out(k) = 1 and special if out(k) > 1. Among special vertices, we
will say that k is binary if out(k) = 2 and tertiary if out(k) = 3.
De…nition 16 We say that an edge ij of a graph G is collapsible if
1. i is an ordinary vertex
2. ji is not an edge of G
3. there is no vertex k such that ki and kj are both edges of G:
De…nition 17 If G has no collapsible edges we will say G is rigid.
If G is a connected graph with a collapsible edge ij, we de…ne the ijcollapse of G to be the graph G0 obtained by deleting the vertex i and the
edge ij, and replacing any edges of the form li with edges lj. The assumptions
on ij imply that the procedure does not introduce any loops or double edges,
hence G0 is also simple (and connected). Moreover each vertex k 6= i has the
same outdegree in G0 as in G:
Lemma 18 If G0 is the ij-collapse of G as above, then

(G)

(G0 ) :

Proof. Let k be any vertex of G0 then k is also a vertex of G. Since i
is ordinary every k-tree in G must contain the edge ij; collapsing this edge
15

gives a k-tree in G0 and moreover every k-tree in G0 arises uniquely in this
manner. Thus we have a factorization
pk (G) = aij pk (G0 ) :
Thus for any two vertices k; l of G0 we get pk (G) =pl (G) = pk (G0 ) =pl (G0 )
and the result follows.
We will say that H is a minor of G if it is obtained from G by a sequence of
steps of the following kind: a) passing to a connected subgraph, b) collapsing
some collapsible edges. By Proposition 15 and Lemma 18 we get
Corollary 19 If H is a minor of G then

4.4

(H)

(G) :

Augmentation

Throughout this section G denotes a connected graph.
Notation 20 We write H E G if H is a connected subgraph of G, and write
H C G to mean H E G and H 6= G.
We say that H C G can be augmented if there is a path P in G whose
endpoints are in H, but which is otherwise completely disjoint from H. We
refer to P as an augmenting path of H, and to K = H [ P as an augmented
graph of H; note that K is also connected, i.e. K E G. It turns out that
augmentation is always possible.
Lemma 21 If H C G then H can be augmented.
Proof. If G and H have the same vertex set then any edge in G n H
comprises an augmenting path. Otherwise consider triples (k; P1 ; P2 ) where
k is a vertex not in H, P1 is a path from some vertex in H to k, and P2
is a path from k to some vertex in H. Among all such triples choose one
with e (P1 ) + e (P2 ) as small as possible. Then P1 and P2 cannot share any
intermediate vertices with H or with each other, else we could construct a
smaller triple. It follows that P = P1 [ P2 is an augmenting path.
We are particularly interested in augmenting paths for H that consist of
one or two edges; we refer to these as short augmentations of H.
Corollary 22 If H C G then G has a minor that is a short augmentation
of H.
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Proof. Let K = H [P be an augmentation of H. If P has more than two
edges, then we may collapse the …rst edge of P in K. The resulting graph is
a minor of G; which is again an augmentation of H. The result follows by
iteration.
Lemma 23 If K = H [ P with P = fjk; klg, then for any vertex i of H we
have ik (K) = ij (H) + 2:
Proof. The edges (j; k) and (k; l) are the unique incoming and outgoing
edges at k. It follows that every i-tree in K is obtained by adding the edge
kl to an i-tree in H, and every k-tree in K is obtained by adding the edge
jk to a j-tree in H. Thus if ajk and akl are the respective weights of the two
edges in the path P then we have
pi (K) = akl pi (H) ; pk (K) = ajk pj (H) =)

akl pi (H)
pi (K)
=
pk (K)
ajk pj (H)

Thus the price ratio in question depends on two additional variables, and the
result follows.
Corollary 24 If G contains the chorded triangle T0 as a proper subgraph
then (G) 5:
Proof. By Corollary 22, G has a minor K = T0 [ P , which is a short
augmentation of T0 , and it is enough to show that (K) 5. If P consists of
two edges fjk; klg then by Remark 11 we can choose i such that ij (T0 ) = 3;
now by Lemma 23, we have cik (K) = 5 and hence (K) 5. If P consists
of a single edge then K is necessarily as below, and once again (K) 5.
2
"#
1

4.5

&

3

p1= p3
b31 (b21 + b23 )
b23 b12 + b23 b13 + b21 b13

The circuit rank

As usual G denotes a simple connected graph, and we will write e (G) and
v (G) for the numbers of edges and vertices of G.
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De…nition 25 The circuit rank of G is de…ned to be
c (G) = e (G)

v (G) + 1

The circuit rank is also known as the cyclomatic number, and it counts
the number of independent cycles in G, see e.g. [3].
Example 26 If G is a k-rose then c (G) = k, and if G is a chorded cycle
then c (G) = 2.
We now prove a crucial property of c (G).
Proposition 27 If H C G then there is some K E G such that H C K and
c (K) = c (H) + 1.
Proof. Let K = H [ P be an augmentation of H. If P consists of
m edges, then K has e (H) + m edges and v (H) + m 1 vertices; hence
c (K) = c (H) + 1.
Corollary 28 Let G be a connected graph.
1. If H C G then c (H) < c (G).
2. c (G) = 0 i¤ G is a single vertex.
3. c (G) = 1 i¤ G is a cycle.
4. c (G) = 2 i¤ G is a chorded cycle or a 2-rose.
Proof. The …rst part follows from Proposition 27, the other parts are
completely straightforward.
Lemma 29 If G is not a rose and c (G) > 3, then there is some K C G
such that K is not a rose and c (K) = 3.
Proof. Let R be a k-rose in G with c (R) = k as large as possible, then
R C G by assumption. If c (R) 2 then any K C G with c (K) = 3 is not a
rose. Thus we may assume that c (R) > 2; and in particular R has a unique
special vertex i and at least three loops. Since R 6= G; R can be augmented,
and S = R [ P is an augmentation, then P cannot both begin and end at i,
else R [ P would be a rose, contradicting the maximality of R. Since there
are at most two endpoints of P; we can choose two distinct loops L1 and L2
of R, such that L1 [ L2 contains these endpoints of P . Then K = L1 [ L2 [ P
is the desired graph.
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4.6

Covered vertices

De…nition 30 Let i be an ordinary vertex of G with outgoing edge ij. We
say that a vertex k covers i, if one of the following holds:
1. the edges ki and kj belong to G
2. j = k and the edge ki belongs to G
If there is no such k then we say that i is an uncovered vertex.
We emphasize that the terminology covered/uncovered is only applicable
to ordinary vertices in a graph G. The main point of this de…nition is the
following simple observation.
Remark 31 An ordinary vertex is uncovered i¤ its outgoing edge is collapsible.
Lemma 32 Suppose G is a connected graph .
1. If v (G)

3 then an ordinary vertex cannot cover another vertex.

2. If v (G)

4 then a binary vertex can cover at most one vertex.

3. A tertiary vertex can cover at most three vertices.
4. If G is a rigid graph with c (G) = 3, then v (G)

4.

Proof. If k is an ordinary vertex covering i then G must contain the
edges ki and ik. Thus i and k do not have any other outgoing edges, and if
G has a third vertex j then there is no path from k or i to j, which contradicts
the connectedness of G, thereby proving the …rst statement.
If k is a binary vertex covering the ordinary vertices i and j then G must
contain the edges ki; kj; ij; ji. The vertices i; j; k cannot have any other
outgoing edges, so a fourth vertex would contradict the connectedness of G
as before. This proves the second statement.
If a vertex k covers i then there must be an edge from k to i. Thus if
out(k) = 3 then k can cover at most three vertices.
If c (G) = 3 then G has either 2 binary vertices or 1 tertiary vertex, with
the remaining vertices being ordinary. If v (G) > 4 then by previous two
paragraphs G would have an uncovered vertex, which is a contradiction.
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4.7

Proof of Theorem 13

Proposition 33 If c (G)

3 and G is not a rose, then

(G)

5.

Proof. By Proposition 15 and Lemma 29 we may assume that c (G) = 3.
By Lemma 18, we may further assume that G is rigid, and thus by Lemma
32 that v (G) 4. We now divide the argument into three cases.
First suppose that G contains a 3-cycle C. We claim that at least one of
the edges of C must be a bidirected edge in G, so that G properly contains
a chorded triangle T0 , whence (G) 5 by Corollary 24. Indeed if G has no
other vertices outside C, then G must have 5 edges and 3 vertices and the
claim is obvious. Thus we may suppose that there is an outside vertex l. We
further claim that C contains two vertices i; j such that i covers j. Granted
this, it is immediate that G contains either the bidirected edge ij and ji, or
the bidirected edge jk and kj where k is the third vertex of C. To prove the
“further”claim we note that the special vertices of G consist of either a) one
tertiary vertex, or b) two binary vertices. In case a) the connectedness of G
implies that the tertiary vertex must be in C, and hence it must cover both
the ordinary vertices in C. In case b) either C contains both binary vertices,
one of which must cover the unique ordinary vertex of C; or C contains one
binary vertex, which must cover one of the two ordinary vertices of C.
Next suppose that G does not contain a 3-cycle, but does contain a 4cycle labeled 1234, say. Now G has two additional edges, which cannot be
the diagonals 13; 31; 24; 42, since otherwise G would have a 3-cycle; therefore
G must have two bidirected edges. The bidirected edges cannot be adjacent
else G would have a collapsible vertex, therefore G must be the …rst graph
below, which has (G) 5.
2
"#
1

!

3
"#
4

p1= p3
b21 b34 b41
b23 b12 (b41 + b43 )

2
"#
1

3
"#
4

p1= p4
b21 b32 b43
b34 b23 b12

Finally suppose G has no 3-cycles or 4-cycles. Then every edge must be
a bidirected edge, and G must be a tree with all bidirected edges. Since G is
not a star, this only leaves the second graph above, which has (G) 6:
We can now …nish the proof of Theorem 13.
Proof of Theorem 13. If c (G) 2 then, by Corollary 28, G is a single
vertex, a cycle, chorded cycle or a 2-rose. If c (G) 3 then the result follows
by Proposition 33.
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5

Proof of Theorem 1

In this section, after a couple of preliminary results, we apply Theorem 13
to prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 34 If G is a chorded cycle on 4 or more vertices, then

(G)

3.

Proof. We can express G as a union of two paths P; Q from 1 to 2, say
and a third path R from 2 to 1. At least one of the …rst two paths, say P
must have an intermediate vertex, say 3. Since m 4 there is an additional
intermediate vertex 4 on one of the paths.
If m = 4 then we get three possible graphs depending on the location of
the vertex 4:
3
"
1

! 4
#
2

3
"
1

! 2
% #
4

3
"
1

! 2
. "
! 4

For these graphs we have 24 = 3; 42 = 3 and 34 = 3, respectively. Thus
(G) 3 in all three cases.
If m > 4 then G can be realized as one of these graphs, albeit with
additional intermediate vertices on one or more of the paths P; Q; R. These
additional vertices are ordinary uncovered vertices, with collapsible outgoing
edges. Collapsing one of these edges does not increase time complexity, and
produces a smaller chorded cycle G0 . Arguing by induction on m we conclude
(G)
(G0 ) 3:
Lemma 35 If G is the complete graph, then
i 6= j.

ij

(G) = m (m

1) for all

Proof. Fix a pair of vertices i 6= j in G. Then we claim that the price
ratio pij (G) depends on each of the m (m 1) edge weights bkl . Indeed if
H is any "spanning" connected subgraph of G then pij (H) is obtained from
pij (G) by specializing to 0 the weights of all edges outside H. Therefore it
su¢ ces to …nd a connected subgraph H such that pij (G) depends on bkl .
We consider two cases. If fi; jg = fk; lg then exchanging i; j if necessary
we may assume i = k; j = l. Let H be an m-cycle two of whose edges are ij
and hi (say); then pi =pj = bhi =bij depends on bkl = bij :
If fi; jg =
6 fk; lg then let H be an 2-rose with loops C1 and C2 such that
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1. k is the special vertex, and kl is an edge in C1
2. i belongs to C1 and j belongs to C2
Then pi and pj are each given by unique directed trees Ti and Tj . Moreover
Ti involves kl while Tj does not. Hence pij (H) depends on bkl :
Proof of Theorem 1. Let S denote the set consisting of the three
special mechanisms: star, cycle and complete. We need to show that M =
S; where M denotes the set of -minimal elements of M = M(m):
Let us say that G is a minimal graph if MG is a minimal mechanism of
M. Now the star mechanism has complexity ( ; ) = (2; 4). Therefore if G
is any minimal graph then either (G) = 1 or (G)
4. For (G) = 1
we get the complete graph, which has complexity ( ; ) = (1; m (m 1)) by
Lemma 35. The graphs with (G)
4 are characterized by Theorem 13,
and we have three possibilities for G:
1. Chorded cycle. In this case we have ( ; ) = (3+ ; 4) by Lemma 34, and
so G is not minimal.
2. Cycle. In this case we have ( ; ) = (m

1; 2) by Lemma 9.

3. k-rose, k 2. If each petal of G has exactly 2 edge then G is the star
mechanism. Otherwise after collapsing edges, we obtain the following
minor with 12 = 3
1
# !
2
Thus G has complexity ( ; ) = (3+ ; 4) and so is not minimal.

Thus the three graphs in the statement of Theorem 1 are the only possible minimal graphs, and have the indicated complexities. Since they are
incomparable with each other, each is minimal. Thus we conclude M = S
as desired.
Remark 36 For m = 3, Lemma 34 does not hold and we have an additional
strongly minimal mechanism with ( ; ) = (2; 4), namely the chorded triangle
#
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6

Proof of Theorem 8

Note that a mechanism is determined uniquely by its net trade function
b, admits a
(a; b) := r(a; b) a which, although initially de…ned for a
natural extension as follows.
Proposition 37 The function
fying
( a+

0 0

a ; b) =

admits a unique extension to S
0

(a; b) +

(a0 ; b);

Proof. Since (a; b) := r(a; b)
r( a +

0 0

a ; b) = r(a; b) +

0

S+ satis-

(a; b) = (a; b) for ;

0

>0

a, it su¢ ces to show

r(a0 ; b);

r (a; b) = r (a; b) for ;

0

> 0 (10)

But this is just Lemma 1 of [8], whose proof we now reproduce for the
sake of completeness.
First observe that, by the conservation of commodities, r(a; b) b for all
a b; moreover if a and a0 in S are such that a + a0 b; then Aggregation
implies the functional (Cauchy) equation r(a + a0 ; b) = r(a; b) + r(a0 ; b).
From Corollary 2 in [1] we conclude that, for all non-negative and 0
such that a + 0 a0 b; the …rst inequality of (10) holds.
Next let a
b and choose
1: Then the argument just given shows
that r( a; b) = r(a; b): On the other hand, Invariance implies that the
left side equals (a; b): Comparing these expressions we obtain the second
inequality of (10).
Thus even for a not less than b, we may de…ne r(a; b) via (10) by choosing
su¢ ciently large. This extends r to all of S S+ :
In view of the above result, we drop the restriction a b when considering
(a; b).
The net trade vector can have negative and positive components, and
hence belongs to Rm . The next de…nition pertains to such vectors in Rm :
De…nition 38 By an i-vector, we mean a vector whose ith component is
positive and all other components are zero. By an {j-vector we mean a vector
that has a negative i-component, a positive j-component and zeros in all other
components.
Proposition 39 For b 2 S+ and any i 6= j there is a 2 S such that (a; b)
is an {j-vector.
23

Proof. Since the graph G underlying the mechanism is connected, there
is a directed path from i to j: Denote the nodes on the path by i = 1; : : : ; t =
j. Let w1 be an i-vector which can be o¤ered on edge 12 to get a return
w2 6= 0 consisting only of commodity 2 (here w2 6= 0 by Non-dissipation);
then w2 can be o¤ered on edge 23 to get w3 6= 0 consisting only of commodity
3, and so on. This yields a sequence w1 ; : : : ; wt such that
wi +
If w =

P

wi ; b = wi+1 for i = 1; : : : ; t

wi then by Proposition 37 we have
P
(w; b) =
wi ; b = wt

1

w1

which is an {j-vector.
It will be convenient to write an {j-vector in the form ( x; y) after suppressing the other components. In the context of the above proposition if
(a; b) = ( x; y) then by linearity (a=x; b) = ( 1; y=x), and we will say
that the o¤er a (or a=x) achieves an ij-exchange ratio of y=x at b.
Proposition 39 shows that there exists at least one o¤er a to achieve an
{j-vector in trade, at any given b. But a is by no means unique. There may
be many paths from i to j; along which i can be exchanged exclusively for j;
and, also, there may be more complicated trading strategies, that use edges
no longer con…ned to any single path, to accomplish such an exchange. These
could give rise to o¤ers di¤erent from a and yield (for the …xed aggregate
b) other {j-vectors in trade. But, as the following lemma shows, the same
exchange ratio obtains under all circumstances.
Lemma 40 If a0 ; a00 achieve ij-exchange ratios

0

;

00

0

at b, then

=

00

.

Proof. By Proposition 39 there exists an a such that (a; b) is a jivector; if is the corresponding exchange ratio then by rescaling a; a0 ; a00 we
may assume that
(a; b) = (1;

) ; (a0 ; b) = ( 1;

0

) ; (a00 ; b) = ( 1;

00

):

By Proposition 37 we get
(a + a0 ; b) = (0;

0

)

0
Now by Non-dissipation we get
, and exchanging the roles of i and j
0
we conclude that
and hence that = 0 . Arguing similarly we get
00
0
=
and hence that = 00
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Lemma 41 Denote the net trade function of M by : Then there is a unique
m
map p : RK
satisfying p(b) (a; b) = 0:
++ ! R++ =
Proof. Fix b 2 S+ and consider the vector
p = (1; p2 ; : : : ; pm )
where pj 1 is the 1j-exchange ratio at b, as in Lemma 40. We will show that
p satis…es the budget balance condition, i.e. that
p

(a; b) = 0 for all a:

(11)

We argue by induction on the number d (a; b) of non-zero components of
(a; b) in positions 2; : : : ; m. If d (a; b) = 0 then (a; b) = 0 by Nondissipation and (11) is obvious. If d (a; b) = 1 then (a; b) is either an
1j-vector or a j1 vector, which by the de…nition of pj and Lemma 40 is
necessarily of the form
x; xpj 1 or x; xpj 1 ;
for such vectors (11) is immediate. Now suppose d (a; b) = d > 1 and …x j
such that j (a; b) 6= 0. Then we can choose a0 such that (a0 ; b) is a 1j or
0
0
a j1- vector such that j (a; b) =
j (a ; b) : It follows that d (a + a ; b) < d
and by linearity we get
p

(a; b) = p

(a + a0 ; b)

p

(a0 ; b) :

By the inductive hypothesis the right side is zero, hence so is the left side.
Finally the uniqueness of the price function is obvious, because the return
function of the mechanism dictates how many units of j may be obtained for
one unit of i, yielding just one possible candidate for the exchange rate for
every pair ij:
We can now prove Theorem 8
Proof. (of Theorem 8) To prove that M = MG it is enough to show that
p and r satisfy (1) and (3).
Let us write, as before,
X
b=
a ; p = p(b) and (a; b) = r(a; b) a:

Consider replacing trader by m traders 1 ; : : : ; m ; where trader j makes
only the o¤ers aij : 1 i m in a that entitle to the return of commodity j: By Aggregation this will have no e¤ect on traders other than ;
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and hence j will get precisely the return rj (a ; b): By Lemma 41, applied
to each such trader j ; we have
X
pj rj (a ; b) =
(12)
pi aij
i

which is just (3).
Now (1) follows by summing (12) over all :

7

A Continuum of Traders

Our analysis easily extends to the case where the set of individuals T is the
unit interval [0; 1], endowed with a nonatomic population measure 12 .R Let S
denote the collection of all integrable functions a : T 7! S such that T a 2
S+ . (An element of S represents a choice of o¤ers by the traders in T which
are positive on aggregate.) In the same vein, let R denote the collection of
all integrable functions from T to C; whose elements r : T 7! C represent
returns to T: An exchange mechanism M , on a given set of m commodities,
is a map from S to R such that, if M maps a to r then we have (re‡ecting
conservation of commodities):
Z
Z
a=
r
T

T

We wrap the Aggregation and Anonymity conditions into one, and directly
postulate that the return to any individual depends only on his own o¤er and
the integral of everyone’s o¤ers, and that this return function is the same for
everyone. Thus we have aR function r from S S+ to C such that r(t) = r(a; b),
where a = a(t) and b = T a: The following lemma is essentially from [6].
Proposition 42 r(a; b) is linear in a (for …xed b) and r(a; b) = r(a; b) for
any a; b and positive scalar :
Proof. We will …rst show that if a; c 2 S and 0 <
r( a + (1

)c; b) = r(a; b) + (1

12

< 1, then

)r(c; b)

Denote the measure
: And Rsince is to be held …xed throughout, we may suppress
R
it, abbreviating T f (t)d (t) by T f for any measurable function f on [0; 1] :

26

There clearly exists an integrable map d from T = [0; 1] to space of offers S such that (i) positive mass of traders choose a in d; (ii) positive
mass
of traders choose
c in d ; and (iii) the integral of d on T is b: So
R
R
r(d ;b)d ( ) = T r(d;b) = b since commodities are conserved. Shift "
T
mass from a to a+(1
)c and (1
)" mass from c to a+(1
)c , letting
the rest be according to d: This yields a new function (from T to S ) which
we call e: Clearly the integral of e on T is also
R again by
R b: Therefore, once
b;
hence
r(d;b) =
conservation
of
commodities,
we
must
have
r(e;b)
=
T
T
R
r(e;b): But this can only be true if the displayed equality holds, proving
T
that (every coordinate of) r is a¢ ne in a for …xed b.
Now r(0; b)
0 by assumption. Suppose r(0; b)
0. Partition T into
two non-null sets T1 and T2 : Consider the case where all the individuals in T1
o¤er 0; and all in T2 o¤er b= (T2 ): Then, since everone in T1 gets the return
(T1 )
r(0; b)
0; by conservation of commodities everyone in T2 gets b
r(0; b) b= (T2 ); contradicting non-dissipation. So r(0; b) = 0; showing r is
linear.
Finally r(a; b) = r( a; b) = r(a; b);where the …rst equality comes
from Invariance and the second from linearity.
Remark 43 As mentioned in the introduction, when there is a continuum
of traders, the star mechanism leads to equivalence (or, near-equivalence) of
Nash and Walras equilibria under suitable postulates regarding the commodity
or …at money. (See [7] for a detailed discussion.)
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